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Abstract
By using the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we provide new evidence on the open-
economy effects of government spending, focusing on a well-known puzzle in the literature,
that the real exchange rate depreciates in response to a fiscal expansion. Much of govern-
ment spending is well anticipated over a one year horizon. Once news and surprise shocks
are treated as different shocks, there is no depreciation puzzle for news shocks while it is still
there for surprise shocks. Fiscal foresight seems to lie at the heart of the different exchange
rate responses to news and surprise shocks, depending on the timing of the anticipated
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1 Introduction
While there is still a widespread disagreement among economists about the effects of govern-
ment spending shocks on consumption, empirical VAR evidence strongly supports, at least
with US data, the view that increases in government spending lead, in advanced economies
with flexible exchange rates, to a depreciation of the real domestic currency (see Kim and
Roubini, 2008, Corsetti and Muller, 2006, Monacelli and Perotti, 2007, Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2007, and Enders, Muller and Scholl, 2011).12 The result stands in sharp
contrast with standard theory, which predicts that fiscal policy expansions appreciate the
real exchange rate. Indeed, the finding has sparked an important research effort to reconcile
the theory with the empirical evidence. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007, show that,
with deep habits, the increase in aggregate demand triggered by government spending leads
to a reduction of the domestic markup, which in turn makes domestic output less expensive,
i.e. the real exchange rate depreciates. Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012, shows evidence
that, in the US, spending expansions are systematically followed by significant spending
reductions over a few year horizons. If, when a positive government spending shock occurs,
agents anticipate such ”spending reversals”, the real long term interest rate may fall, lead-
ing to a real depreciation of the exchange rate, as well as an improvement of the external
balance.
A few recent works have maintained that fiscal policy actions are anticipated to a large
extent, because of the existence of legislative and implementation lags. That is, agents
receive signals about future changes in taxes and government spending well before these
changes take actually place (see e.g. Yang, 2007, Leeper, Walker and Yang, 2013, Mertens
and Ravn, 2010).
Fiscal anticipation entails an important difficulty for VAR analysis. As shown by Leeper,
Walker and Yang, 2013, if the VAR does not contain enough information, the underlying
structural MA representation of the variables considered in the VAR is not invertible, or
“non-fundamental”, so that the VAR is misspecified and can provide misleading results.
Evidence of non-fundamentalness for a standard closed economy VAR specification is pro-
vided by Ramey, 2011, which shows that the spending shock estimated with this spec-
ification is predicted by the forecasts reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters
1Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Fatas and Mihov, 2001, Gali, Lopez Salido and Valles, 2007, Mountford
and Uhlig, 2002, and Perotti, 2002, 2007, find that consumption increases. Ramey, 2011, Ramey and and
Shapiro, 1998, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher, 2004, Cavallo, 2005, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher,
1999, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2005, find that consumption declines. Kim and Roubini, 2008, find that the
trade balance improves while Monacelli and Perotti, 2007, and Ravn, Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007, find
that it worsens.
2Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen, 2008, Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen, 2008 and Benetrix and
Lane, 2009 find that for European countries the real exchange rate appreciates.
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and therefore cannot be a genuine structural shock.3 Hence, at least in principle, the
puzzling open-economy effects of government spending shocks could be an artifact due to
non-fundamentalness.
Apart from the fundamentalness problem, the traditional identification scheme of Blan-
chard and Perotti, 2002, being based on actual current spending changes, is unsuited to
capture “news” or “foresight” shocks, which, by their very definition, have only delayed
effects on spending. Ramey, 2011, proposes different specifications and methods, based on
newspaper sources like the Business Week, as well as the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Such sources of information seem potentially useful to capture foresight shocks.
Summing up, the fiscal foresight literature raises several questions which are still open.
First, is government spending really anticipated? and to what extent? After all, it can
be argued that, even when a specific expenditure has already been earmarked, there is
still a substantial uncertainty about the exact timing of the disbursement. Is it possible
to document fiscal anticipation with time series data? Second, assuming that fiscal fore-
sight is effectively there, non-fundamentalness, while being a possibility, is not a necessary
implication of fiscal anticipation, and depends on the particular VAR specification chosen
by the econometrician. Are standard open economy VAR specifications really affected by
non-fundamentalness? Finally, assuming that we have enough information in the VAR and
the fundamentalness problem is not there, how can we identify the foresight shocks? Are
they quantitatively important? And what are their effects?
We address these questions by using the Survey of Professional Forecasters. We find that
government spending is predicted much better than GDP and consumption over the 1-year
horizon. This result provides a definite empirical support for the fiscal foresight hypothesis.
On the other hand, 1-quarter ahead government spending is predicted worse than GDP and
consumption, so that fiscal foresight is essentially a medium-run phenomenon. We rational-
ize this finding by assuming, as is usual in the “news shock” literature, that there are both
“anticipated” and “non-anticipated” shocks. The former are “news” or “foresight” shocks,
which have only delayed effects on spending but, on impact, affect agents’ expectations.
The latter are “surprise” shocks, which affect spending on impact and are only observed
when agents see realized spending. Such shocks are conceptually identical to the spending
shocks of the traditional VAR approach a` la Blanchard and Perotti, 2002.
Using the fundamentalness test proposed in Forni and Gambetti, 2014, we find (some-
what surprisingly and contrary to the result obtained in Ramey, 2011) that, despite fiscal
3The solution to the problem of non-fundamentalness is to extend the econometrician information set.
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature. Mertens and Ravn, 2010, use Blaschke factors, i.e.
dynamic rotations of the reduced form VAR innovations. Forni and Gambetti, 2010, employ a structural
factor model. Ellahie and Ricco, 2012, uses a large Bayesian VAR. Leeper, Richter and Walker 2012, uses
municipal bonds and SPF data to identify fiscal news.
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foresight, our open-economy VAR specification is not affected by non-fundamentalness.
Hence, the explanation for the puzzling behavior of exchange rates must be sought else-
where.
From the methodological point of view, the main contribution of this paper is repre-
sented by a new VAR procedure to identify news shocks based on the SPF. First, we use
the professional forecasts of government spending to construct a variable which is affected
contemporaneously by the news shock. Then we include this variable in the VAR, ordered
second after government spending, and identify by imposing a standard Cholesky scheme.
The second residual is the news shock, whereas the first one is the surprise shock.
Our estimated news shock displays spikes coinciding with episodes like the fall of the
Berlin Wall (1989:IV), the War in Afghanistan (2001:IV), the I and II Gulf Wars (1990:III
and 2003:I) and the approval of the fiscal stimulus package (2009:I). All these episodes are
followed by substantial changes in government expenditures.
We find that the effects of news shocks, in terms of explained variance, are quantitatively
comparable to those of surprise shocks. Hence, they should not be neglected when evaluating
fiscal policy. News shocks raise both consumption and output, the government spending
multiplier being above one in the short run and essentially zero in the long-run. The
fiscal expansion generates a significant increase of the long-term interest rate, a significant
appreciation of the dollar and a significant deterioration of the current account balance.
Hence there is no “depreciation puzzle” for the news shock. On the contrary, in line with the
result of the fundamentalness test, the surprise shock estimated with the VAR specification
including the survey variable is almost identical to the one obtained with the standard
specification and its effects are the same, i.e. the long-term interest rate declines and the
dollar depreciates.
At first sight, the effects of news and surprise shocks may seem in sharp contrast to each
other; but a closer look reveals that all differences boil down to a phase shift of four-five
years and are related to expectations with opposite sign. After a positive surprise shock,
government spending increases on impact but then decreases immediately and declines
below the pre-shock level after about four-five years. As a consequence, agents immediately
revise their expectations of future spending downward, long-term interest rates decline
and the domestic currency depreciates, as predicted in Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012.
By contrast, after a news shock, government spending increases gradually and reaches a
maximum after about four-five years. The news shock also exhibits spending reversals, but
they occur much later. Hence agents anticipate an increase of government spending, the
long-term interest rate increases and the domestic currency appreciates.
To better evaluate whether the effects of the news shock are in line with the theory, we
introduce a news shock into the two-country model of Faccini, Mumtaz and Surico, 2012,
which is a simplified version of Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012. The effects of both the
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news and the surprise shocks on the long-run interest rate, the exchange rate and net exports
are consistent with the model, when a term inducing spending reversals is included in the
policy rule. On the other hand, the effects of both shocks on consumption are puzzling.
This translates into a puzzling behavior of GDP, especially for the news shock: the theory
predicts that GDP should fall on impact after an expansionary shock while VAR evidence
suggests the opposite.
Our identifying procedure was first proposed in an old version of this paper, i.e. Gam-
betti, 2012, which of course is absorbed in the present work. Our procedure has been used
in two interesting papers, i.e. Ricco, 2013, which does not focus on open-economy issues,
and Caggiano et al., 2014, where a nonlinear VAR is estimated to assess whether news
shocks have different effects in booms and recessions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents and qualify
fiscal foresight by using professional forecasts. Section 3 addresses the fundamentalness
question. Section 4 presents our identification strategy and discusses the relation of our
work with previous literature, with special emphasis on Ramey, 2011, and Perotti, 2011.
Section 5 presents evidence about the news and the surprise shocks, as well as their impulse-
response functions. Section 6 discusses the relation of our empirical results with the theory.
A robustness analysis is provided in the Appendix.
2 Is government spending anticipated?
Policy measures like Obama’s Fiscal Stimulus or the Budget Control Act of 2011 provide a
clear indication about the sign of future government spending changes, but the size and the
timing of such changes are often uncertain to a large extent. Does fiscal foresight imply that
government spending is more predictable than other economic variables, like for instance
GDP or consumption? The answer is far from obvious. To our knowledge, there are no
empirical works documenting fiscal foresight with time series data. The aim of this section is
to provide evidence about fiscal policy anticipation and to quantify fiscal foresight by using
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF henceforth) reported by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia.
As a first step we evaluate the forecasting accuracy of SPF as compared to simple
standard time series models. This is an important exercise to gauge the informational
content of the SPF forecasts.
In the SPF, the forecasts of the levels are subject to several changes of the base year
during the sample period. Hence, following Ramey, 2011, and Perotti, 2011, we focus on
the forecasts of the growth rates. Precisely, we use the annualized percent change of mean
responses for the real federal government consumption expenditure and gross investment.
The Survey reports, for each quarter t, the forecasts ft(h) made at time t for periods
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t + h, h = 0, . . . , 4. At time t, when the forecasts are made, the forecasters know (the
first release) of government spending growth for time t − 1. From the original data we
derive the implied cumulated forecasts, i.e. the forecasts of government spending growth
between t and t + h, call it Ft(0, h) =
∑h
j=0 ft(j). We evaluate the accuracy of f(h) and
F (0, h), h = 0, . . . , 4. The target is the government spending growth (mnemonic FEDGOV,
see below for a complete description of the data) for the whole period 1981:III-2013:III
(multiplied by 400 to get annualized percentage rates). We shall keep this sample period
throughout the paper. The starting date is the starting date of the Survey.
The times series models we use are: (a) the best univariate autoregressive model (order
4); (b) the 4-lag autoregression augmented with the first lag of real GDP growth and the first
lag of the spread between 10-year government bonds yield and the federal funds rate. The
initial date of the sample is 1960:I and the parameters are estimated with a rolling window
of 82 quarters.4 To make a fair comparison, we compute fa(h) and f b(h), h = 0, . . . , 4, by
using data up to time t− 1.5 Hence fa(h) and f b(h) are what are usually called the h+ 1-
step-ahead forecasts. For h > 0, the forecasts are obtained by direct projections (rather
than the iterative method). The accuracy of the forecasts is measured by the mean square
forecast error (MSFE), normalized by dividing by the variance of the target. This number
is the fraction of unpredictable variance, which can be interpreted as measuring the degree
of “foresight”.
Results are reported in Table 1. The professional forecasts perform better than time
series models at all horizons. For h = 3, 4 the difference is significant according to the
Diebold and Mariano test, for both cumulative and non-cumulative forecasts. The finding
suggests that SPF data provide useful information for predicting government spending.
Next we compare the accuracy of the professional forecasts for FEDGOV growth with
the accuracy of professional forecasts for GDP growth and consumption growth. Table 1
shows the results. An interesting finding emerges. Predictability of consumption and GDP
decreases with the horizon whereas the predictability of government spending increases
with the horizon. At horizon 4, for instance, the cumulative-forecast mean-square errors for
real GDP and consumption are 0.71 and 0.77 respectively, as against 0.50 for FEDGOV.
At short horizons, particularly the first quarter, the rankings are reversed: both GDP and
consumption growth are predicted better than FEDGOV growth (0.52 and 0.64 respectively,
as against 0.80 for FEDGOV).
Higher predictability of government spending relative to GDP at longer horizons sup-
ports the presence of fiscal anticipation. Nonetheless it must be noticed that fiscal foresight
does not hold in the very short run and even at the 4-quarter horizon there is still a substan-
4Keeping fixed the starting date of the sample used for estimation provides qualitatively similar results.
5Notice, however, that we do not use vintage data, so that the econometrician knows the last release of
FEDGOV, whereas the professional forecasters know only the first release.
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tial fraction of variance which is not anticipated. A plausible interpretation is that future
government spending over a one-year or two-year horizon is well anticipated, but the exact
timing of expenditure across different quarters is highly unpredictable. In sum, our results
are compatible with the existence of a sizable “foresight” shock as well as a non-anticipated
or “surprise” shock having large short-run effects.
3 Does the depreciation puzzle depend on non-fundamental-
ness?
Several papers have noticed that fiscal foresight can lead to non-fundamentalness of the
structural MA representation of the variables included in the VAR (see Leeper, Walker
and Yang, 2013, for a thorough discussion). The problem arises from the fact that fiscal
variables do not convey information about the current news shock because they react only
with a delay. If the VAR information is deficient VAR results can be misleading. Well
known monetary policy puzzles like the price puzzle and the exchange rate puzzle are
due to informational deficiency and disappear when VAR information is properly amended
(Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, 2005; Forni and Gambetti, 2010). This could in principle be
the case also for the puzzling open-economy effects of government spending.
On the other hand, news is likely to affect immediately forward-looking variables like
interest rates and exchange rates, given that these variables closely reflect agents’ expecta-
tions. Including such variables in the VAR might provide enough information to reconstruct
the relevant shocks. Hence fundamentalness, or sufficient information, is ultimately an em-
pirical question. In previous literature fundamentalness has been tacitly assumed without
testing because fundamentalness tests were not available. Ramey, 2011, is a noticeable
exception, since the Granger-causality test used therein is essentially equivalent to a funda-
mentalness test.
We test for sufficient information by using the orthogonality test recently proposed by
Forni and Gambetti, 2014. The test is based on a simple theoretical result: if any linear
combination of the VAR residuals is correlated with the past of available information, the
structural MA representation of the variables included in the VAR is non-fundamental
and the VAR is misspecified, in the sense that it does not include enough information to
reconstruct the structural shocks. The testing procedure is the following: first, estimate a
VAR and identify the shocks of interest; second, regress such shocks on the past values of a
set of variables reflecting agents’ information and perform an F-test for the significance of
the regression. We use as regressors both the principal components of a large macroeconomic
data set and the professional forecasts.
The government spending shock is identified, following Blanchard and Perotti, 2002,
as the first Cholesky shock in a VAR including, in that order, real federal government
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consumption expenditures and gross investment (FEDGOV), real GDP, real personal con-
sumption expenditures (CONS), the federal surplus divided by GDP (SUR), net exports of
goods and services divided by GDP (NX), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
(10YBOND) and the real exchange rate (RER). This is specification A.6 Following pre-
vious literature, FEDGOV, GDP and CONS are taken in log-levels (multiplied by 100 to
express the impulse-response functions in percentage rates of variation). The time span is
1981:III-2013:III (as already noticed, the starting date is the starting date of the Survey).
We estimated a Bayesian VAR with diffuse prior and 4 lags.
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of the unit variance government spending
shock, together with the 68% (dark gray) and the 90% (light gray) probability intervals.7
The impulse response functions report the puzzle. There is a depreciation of the US dollar
driven by a fall in interest rate which improves net export.
Using the estimated government spending shock we run the orthogonality test. For
comparison, we also report the results for a simple three-variable specification including
FEDGOV, GDP and CONS (specification B). We regress the estimated government spend-
ing shock on seven sets of regressors: the first five include the series reported by the Survey,
from f(0) to f(4), taken one at a time. The sixth set (All) includes all of the series f(h),
h = 0, . . . , 4. The seventh set includes the lags of a single series that we shall use in the
sequel, i.e. the cumulated forecast F (1, 4) = f(1) + · · ·+ f(4).
Results are shown in Table 2. The table reports the p-values of the test for the seven sets
of regressors (rows) and different numbers of lags (columns). The upper panel shows results
for specification B; the lower panel for specification A. Orthogonality is clearly rejected for
the shock estimated with the small VAR by many regressor-lag configurations. By contrast,
fundamentalness is never rejected in the lower panel.8 Similar results (not shown here) are
obtained when regressing the other six shocks of the Cholesky identification.9
The result is confirmed when the surprise shock is regressed onto the principal com-
ponents of a large data set (this is the implementation suggested in Forni and Gambetti,
2014). The data set is the one of Forni et al., 2014, to which we refer for more detailed
6FEDGOV: BEA code B823RA3; GDP: BEA code A191RX1; CONS: BEA code DPCERX1; SUR: federal
receipts, BEA code W018RC1, minus federal expenditures, BEA code W019RC1, over nominal GDP, BEA
code A191RC1; NX: net exports of goods and services, BEA code A019RC1, divided by GDP; 10YBOND:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; RER: trade weighted U.S. dollar index, major currencies,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 10YBOND and the exchange rate index are quarterly
averages of the original monthly series.
7The reported impulse response functions are the averages of the posterior distribution over 500 draws.
8In a previous version of the paper (Gambetti, 2012) we found that fundamentalness was rejected. This
is because we used a different VAR specification in two respects. First we did not include the long-term
interest rate. Second, we used growth rates instead of levels for FEDGOV, GDP, CONS, SUR and NX.
9We also performed the Granger causality test proposed in Forni and Gambetti, 2014, obtaining the same
result.
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information about the series and the data treatment. Table 3 shows that specification B is
deficient, whereas the seven-variable specification A is not.
We conclude that there is no evidence of non-fundamentalness for the open-economy
VAR specification. Hence the depreciation puzzle cannot be due to non-fundamentalness.
4 Identifying government spending shocks
The evidence of Section 2 supports the existence of a sizable “news” shock as well as a
non-anticipated or “surprise” shock. The former represents news in the sense that it is
observed by agents at time t but has delayed effects on government spending. The latter is
a surprise since it immediately affects government spending but is only known once agents
observe spending itself.
The news-surprise representation has become common in the literature focusing on
technology news shocks. In line with this literature, to ensure that the news shock has zero
impact effect on spending, we impose a Cholesky identification scheme with government
spending ordered first and a suitable variable, capturing agents’ current information about
future change in government spending, ordered second. The first shock is the surprise shock
and the second shock is the news shock.
The basic novelty of our approach is the variable revealing the news shock, which is
ordered second in the VAR. We use two different variables, so that we have two VAR
specifications. The former is the SPF expectation of future spending growth for the following
four quarters, i.e. the cumulated forecast F (1, 4) introduced in Section 3. The latter is
a ”news variable” defined as the difference between the forecast of government spending
growth, made at time t, for the following quarters reported by the Survey, and the forecast,
for the same quarters, made at time t− 1.
4.1 Assumptions
To better illustrate our foresight variables and motivate our identification scheme, it is
useful to introduce a few assumptions about spending growth and the SPF forecasts.
First, we assume that the growth rate of government spending, gt, follows the model
gt = φ(L)εt + θ(L)ηt + δ(L)ξt, (1)
where φ(L) =
∑∞
k=0 φkL
k, θ(L) =
∑∞
k=0 θkL
k and δ(L) =
∑∞
k=0 δkL
k are impulse response
functions in the lag operator L, εt is the foresight shock, ηt is the surprise shock and ξt is
a non-policy shock reflecting “endogeneity” of public spending, i.e. a possible automatic,
non-discretionary reaction of spending to shocks affecting some target variable like GDP.
All shocks are normalized to have unit variance. The shock ξt may be a vector, in which
case δk is a row vector. By definition of news shock, government spending will react with
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some delay s > 0 to εt, i.e. φk = 0 for k < s. By contrast, θ0 6= 0 is the distinguishing
feature of the “surprise” shock.
Moreover, following Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, we assume that the non-policy shocks
have no contemporaneous effects on gt, owing to some perception and/or implementation
delay, i.e. δ0 = 0. The condition δ0 = 0 is the condition that we impose when ordering
after government spending and the SPF variable all other variables included in the VAR
specification.
Finally, we make an important assumption about the informational flows of the Survey.
Let Pt be the information set of economic agents, as well as professional forecasters, at time
t, and EPt be the expectation conditional on Pt. As observed above, the Survey reports,
for each t, the forecast made at time t for gt, gt+1, . . . , gt+4. At time t, the forecasters know
the (first release of) gt−1. Contrary to the simplifying assumption commonly made in the
literature, the nowcast of gt is very different from gt, i.e. E
P
t gt 6= gt. This is only possible
if agents observe with delay some of the shocks appearing in equation (1).
Clearly the news shock cannot be observed with delay by its very definition, since it
reflects precisely the new information about future spending growth which is available at
time t. By contrast, the surprise shock reflects unexpected changes of spending growth,
and is likely fully observed when official data become available, which happens with some
delay. To make things simple, we assume that agents observe ηt with a one-period delay,
i.e. at time t + 1. For convenience, we make the same assumption about ξt (this makes
little difference, as we shall show that ξt has small effects on spending).
Formally, we assume EPt ηt = EPt ξt = 0, EPt ηt−k = ηt−k, EPt ξt−k = ξt−k for k > 0, and
EPt εt−k = εt−k for k ≥ 0. We show in the sequel that this assumption, besides being a
simple and convenient way to rationalize the large difference between the nowcast of gt and
gt itself, is consistent with the empirical evidence.
4.2 Specification #1
Given these assumptions, our aim is to construct a variable which is affected by εt at time
t (unlike gt, which is only affected at time t + s) and therefore conveys information about
its current value (rather than its past values). The simple case gt = εt−s can be useful to
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illustrate our point. In this case, we have:
EPt gt+1 = εt−s+1
. . .
EPt gt+s−1 = εt−1
EPt gt+s = εt
EPt gt+s+1 = 0
. . .
EPt gt+H = 0
If the number of periods of anticipation were known, we could simply take EPt gt+s. Unfor-
tunately in practice s is unknown and this case is more problematic. For, if we consider the
“wrong” horizon h 6= s, the expectation does not contain εt and therefore is useless to our
purpose. However, the sum of the expectations up to H-period ahead
Ft(1, H) =
H∑
h=1
EPt gt+h = εt + ...+ εt−s+1
always contains εt, provided that H ≥ s.
Going back to the general case of equation (1), by summing the first h-period ahead
expectation, h = 1, ...,H, we obtain
Ft(1, H) =
H∑
h=1
EPt gt+h = φ˜0εt +
∞∑
j=1
φ˜jεt−j +
∞∑
j=1
θ˜jηt−j +
∞∑
j=1
δ˜jξt−j (2)
where φ˜0 =
∑H
k=s φk, φ˜j =
∑H+j
k=j+1 φk, θ˜j =
∑H+j
k=j+1 θk, δ˜j =
∑H+j
k=j+1 δk. Note that
Ft(1, H) also contains the lags of all the shocks. However, by running a VAR including
Ft(1, H), we condition on the past of the variables and get rid of the lagged values of the
shocks. We call “Specification #1” the VAR specification including Ft(1, H) and “Identifi-
cation #1” the corresponding identification.
4.3 Specification #2
Our second specification hinges on a news variable defined as the difference between the
forecast of government spending growth, made at time t, for the following quarters reported
by the Survey, and the forecast, for the same quarters, made at time t − 1. Under our
assumptions, the revision of the h-step ahead forecast is
EPt gt+h − EPt−1gt+h = φhεt + θh+1ηt−1 + δh+1ξt−1. (3)
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Again, the revision misses the target if h 6= s. By contrast, summing the first H revisions
we get
nt(1, H) = Ft(1, H)− Ft−1(2, H + 1)
=
H∑
h=1
(EPt gt+h − EPt−1gt+h)
= φ˜0εt + θ˜1ηt−1 + δ˜1ξt−1 (4)
which always contains εt as long as H ≥ s. The news variable conveys the new information
that becomes available at time t: the current news shock, as before, and the first lag of
the other shocks. As before, identification can be achieved by conditioning onto the past
of the variables. We call “Specification #2” the VAR specification including nt(1, H) and
“Identification #2” the corresponding identification.
4.4 Alternative orderings and surprise shocks
Our Cholesky ordering correspond to a standard practice in the news shock literature. It
amounts to define the news shock as the residual of the projection of the SPF variable onto
the space spanned by the past of all variables, plus the present of gt. This residual, under
the fundamentalness assumption, is, for both specifications, φ˜0εt (see equations 2 and 4),
which delivers εt after normalization to get unit variance. Note however that, under our
informational assumptions, the SPF variable could alternatively be ordered first, since, as
shown in equations (2) and (4), both Ft(1, H) and nt(1, H) contain only past values of ηt,
so that only conditioning on the past of the variables (without the present of gt) should
produce similar result. In the Appendix we show that this is in fact the case. This evidence
provides a confirmation for our assumption about the delayed observation of ηt, since, would
ηt be observed at time t, the two projections would deliver different results.
Coming to the surprise shock, let observe that we identify it in just the same way as the
spending shock of the traditional VAR approach of Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, i.e. as the
first Cholesky shock of our VAR specification, where government spending is ordered first.
Put another way, we take the residual of the projection of gt onto the past of all variables.
Letting Et−1gt denote such projection, under our assumptions (and given fundamentalness),
the residual is
gt − Et−1gt = φ0εt + θ0ηt + δ0ξt = θ0ηt (5)
Unit variance normalization gives an estimate of ηt.
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10Even in the case of the surprise shock, under our assumptions, government spending could be ordered
second after the SPF variable and the surprise shock could be defined as the second one in the Cholesky
decomposition. This is because also conditioning on the present of the SPF variable, which does not contain
ηt, should be ineffective.
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4.5 Relations with the literature
Ramey, 2011, uses gt−EPt−1 in place of gt, in order to identify a government spending shock
which is not anticipated by professional forecasters. The variable is ordered first in a VAR;
the first Cholesky shock is the estimated government spending shock.
According to our assumptions
gt − EPt−1gt = θ0ηt + θ1ηt−1 + δ1ξt−1. (6)
If the VAR contains enough information, Ramey’s procedure delivers the correct result,
since by conditioning on the past of the variables we cancel the past values of the shocks
from the right-hand side of the above equation. In the Appendix we show that Ramey’s
method gives the same results as ours.
Ramey’s procedure is essentially equivalent to retaining gt as the first variable and
augmenting the VAR with the 1-step-ahead forecast from SPF. The latter strategy is the
one followed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012, and Born et al., 2013. Both methods
are termed “EVARs” (Expectation augmented VARs) by Perotti, 2011. EVARs are aimed
at cleaning the surprise shock from anticipated government spending changes and can be
useful if the VAR specification, with no SPF information, is non-fundamental. Note however
that EVARs, as defined above, are useless to find the news shock εt, which does not appear
in equation (6).
If non-fundamentalness is not there, the procedures in Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, and
Ramey, 2011, should produce the same result. In the Appendix we show that this is the case
for our open economy specification, consistently with the results of Section 3. Perotti, 2011,
documents that the EVAR-SVAR equivalence holds true for a standard closed economy
information set. We interpret Perotti’ findings as indicating that his specification, like ours,
is essentially unaffected by the non-fundamentalness problem.
Perotti, 2011, observes that
gt − EPt−1gt =
(
gt − EPt gt
)
+
(
EPt gt − EPt−1gt
)
(7)
and argues that the former term on the right hand side is the one which really matters,
whereas the latter term, ”which is the one that can be related to the wealth effect of the
neoclassical model, is essentially noise”. From this he concludes that SPF data cannot help
in identifying government spending shocks.
Under our assumptions,
gt − EPt gt = θ0ηt
EPt gt − EPt−1gt = θ1ηt−1 + δ1ξt−1.
These two equations explain Perotti’s findings: the former term is the one which really
matters to identify the surprise shock, while the latter does not contain the present of ηt and
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therefore is uninformative.11 This however depends on the information set of professional
forecasters and should not be interpreted as meaning that SPF data are useless, since they
are useful to identify the news shock εt. More generally, the fact that E
P
t−1gt is a poor
predictor of gt is consistent with the results reported in Section 2. It does not depend on
poor quality of SPF data, but on the fact that gt is subject to a large short-run uncertainty,
owing to the large impact effect of ηt. On the other hand, we know that gt is very well
predicted at the 1-year horizon and this is consistent with the large, delayed effects of εt
that are shown in the following section.
We conclude this subsection by briefly discussing the Ramey’s military spending variable.
As documented in Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012, when the variable is included in a
recursive VAR with government spending ordered first, such variable does not modify the
puzzling effects of surprise shocks on exchange rates. This finding is in line with our result
that standard open economy VAR specification are not affected by the problem of deficient
information. On the other hand, when identifying the spending shock as the first one in a
recursive VAR with Ramey’s variable ordered first, the shock has negative contemporaneous
and lagged effects on spending. This means that the shock should be interpreted as a
negative surprise shock rather than a positive foresight shock. The positive effects on
the exchange rate are then correctly interpreted in Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012, as
confirming the puzzle rather than denying it. The result suggests that the Ramey’s variable
seems unsuited to correctly capture the foresight shock.
5 Evidence
In this section we report the empirical results obtained by estimating our VAR specifications
#1 and #2. The longest available horizon in the SPF is 4. We therefore take H = 4 for
Specification #1, which therefore includes Ft(1, 4). As for Specification #2, we are forced
to take nt(1, 3), since nt(1, 4) = Ft(1, 4) − Ft−1(2, 5) would involve horizon 5, which is not
available. The other variables included in the VAR are the seven variables used in Section
3 for Specification A. The sample period is again 1981:III-2013:III. As for Specification A,
we estimated a Bayesian VAR with diffuse prior and four lags.
5.1 The news variable and the estimated news shocks
To begin, let us analyze the informational content of the news variable nt(1, 3) used in
Identification #2. The top panel of Figure 2 plots the series. Positive (negative) values
11Ricco, 2013, identifies the surprise shock (which he name “misexpected shock”) by using the nowcast
error in place of gt. We do this as a robustness exercise in Subsection 5.5. In addition, Ricco takes a different
point of view about the term EPt gt −EPt−1gt, which he uses to identify a third kind of government spending
shock.
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mean that professional forecasters revise their expectations about future spending upward
(downward). The variable displays positive spikes in coincidence of three war episodes:
the Gulf War (1990:III), the War in Afghanistan (2001:IV), and the Iraq War (2003:I).
As documented in the literature, these episodes are associated with sizable increases in
military spending.12 A negative spike is observed in correspondence to the fall of the
Berlin Wall (1989:IV). This is in line with Ramey, 2011, which estimates a spending cut of
about 507.6 billions of dollars in 1989 associated with the end of the Cold War. Moreover
the series displays large variations in coincidence with legislative acts like the Obama’s
fiscal stimulus package (2009:I) or the Strategic Defense Initiative (1983:I). The evidence
reinforces the result of Section 2, pointing out that the news variable actually contains
valuable information related to changes in government spending.
The mid and bottom panels of Figure 2 plot the two news shocks obtained under Iden-
tification #1 and Identification #2 respectively. Despite a few differences, the two shocks
are very similar, the correlation being 0.8. There is still a striking correspondence between
peaks and troughs of the shocks and the political episodes associated with the vertical
lines. Moreover, for the shock obtained with Identification #1, the matching is perhaps
even stronger: in particular, the fiscal stimulus of the Bush administration in 2008 is now
visible.13 All the shocks are orthogonal to the lags of the SPF forecasts as well as the lags
of the principal components used in Table 3.14
5.2 The effects of news shocks
Figure 3 plots the impulse response functions of the news shock obtained with Identification
#1. The estimated effect on spending is small in the first three quarters, in accordance with
the idea of anticipation, and becomes large and significant at lag 4. The maximal effect is
reached after about four years. After four years, spending declines gradually toward zero.
Federal surplus (fifth panel) moves symmetrically. Consistently with the effect on spending,
the expectation of future spending growth, reported in the upper-left panel, is positive; it
decreases gradually after the positive impact and becomes negative after about four years.
GDP is almost unaffected on impact. The positive effect after one year is barely sig-
nificant. We computed the government spending multiplier as the effect on log GDP at
various lags, divided by the maximal effect on log spending, divided by the average share
of government spending over GDP. After an impact of 0.4, it reaches a maximum of about
1.3 after one year, is nearly 1 after 6 quarters, and reaches 0 after about two years. Hence
federal spending crowds out private spending in the medium-run. The effect on consump-
12According to Ramey, 2011, in these three episodes government spending increased in the following
quarters by about 112.1, 296.3 and 123.8 billions of dollars respectively.
13The news-based shock is very similar to nt(1, 3) itself, the correlation being 0.81.
14Results are available upon request.
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tion is positive and significant on impact and declines thereafter, losing significance after 6
quarters. The real exchange rate appreciates significantly and, consistently, the trade bal-
ance significantly worsens. The results can be explained by the response of the long-term
interest rate which rises immediately and significantly, anticipating future spending growth
and the reduction of Federal surplus.
Table 4, upper panel, shows the variance decomposition at different horizons. The
fraction of the forecast error variance of government spending explained by the news shock
is relatively large. At the 6-year horizon the foresight shock explains almost 30% of total
variance. The estimated effects on GDP and consumption are modest in terms of variance
decomposition, apart from the 10% of consumption volatility explained by the shock on
impact. At the 2-year horizon, the shock accounts for 10 and 12% of the volatility of the
10-year bond and the exchange-rate variation, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions obtained with Identification #2. The
response of government spending is again zero on impact, increases slowly, reaching the
maximal level after about 3 years. Both consumption and output increase significantly in
the short-run but in the long-run the effect is zero or even negative. The deficit to GDP
ratio does not change significantly, although the point estimate is positive in the short run,
when output increases and spending is unchanged and then falls in the long run, when
output is back to its pre-shock level and spending is significantly higher.
The effects on the real exchange rate, the trade balance and the interest rate net exports
are similar to those obtained before, confirming that, for the news shock, the depreciation
puzzle is not there.
Table 4, central panel, shows the variance decomposition at different horizons. The
fraction of the forecast error variance of government spending explained by the anticipated
shock is much smaller than that obtained with Identification #1 even in the long run: only
about 11% at the 6-year horizon. Reducing the maximal forecasting horizon seems to be
detrimental in terms of variance decomposition, in accordance with the finding of Figure
3, that government spending has a large reaction at lag 4. The estimated effect on GDP
reaches a maximum of 13% at the 1-year horizon. At the 2-year horizon, the shock explains
about 17% of the volatility of the 10-year bond interest rate and about 14% of the exchange-
rate variation. Albeit not very large, these effects are quantitatively comparable to those
of the surprise shock (indeed, they are often larger). Hence, they should not be neglected
when evaluating the effects of fiscal policy.
5.3 The estimated surprise shocks
Figure 5 displays the three surprise shocks obtained with Specification A (top panel), Spec-
ification #1 (mid panel), and Specification #2 (bottom panel).
A few remarks are in order. First, the three shocks are almost identical, the correlations
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being around 0.95. This confirms the fact that the shock is already well identified with
Specification A, in line with the fundamentalness test performed in Section 3. Second,
the surprise shock seems to be poorly connected with historical events, since there are no
large peaks or troughs in correspondence of the vertical lines. This behavior is consistent
with our definition of news and surprise shock. In fact, while the former reflects changes
in expectations often related to identifiable political events, the latter mainly reflects the
deviations of realized spending from such expectations and therefore there is no reason to
expect a correspondence either in the timing or in the sign.
5.4 The effects of surprise shocks
Figure 6 plots the impulse response functions of the surprise shock estimated with Identifi-
cation #1. We do not report the results for Identification #2 since they are almost identical.
The impulse response functions are very similar to those of Figure 1. Again these results
are mutually consistent and in line with the findings of Section 3.
The effect on government spending is large on impact, then declines gradually, and
takes on negative values after about five years. At long-run horizons the effect is negative.
Hence, there is spending reversal. Symmetrically, federal surplus declines on impact and in
the short-run, but increases in the long-run. In terms of variance decomposition (Table 4)
the effect of the unanticipated shock is very large in the short run but is smaller than that
of the foresight shock at the 6-year horizon (about 20%).
GDP reacts positively and significantly on impact; after 2 periods, the effect becomes
negative, albeit not significant. The effect on consumption is zero on impact and negative
in the short-medium run; however, it is quantitatively modest and not significant. The
variance decomposition of Table 4 confirms that the effects on GDP and consumption are
small, but for the contemporaneous effect on GDP, which explains about 10% of GDP
volatility.
5.5 Spending reversals
For the surprise shock, unexpected spending increases are reabsorbed by spending reversals.
The finding provides support to the thesis put forward in Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012.
Consistently agents revise their expectation of future spending downward, see the upper-
left panel of Figure 6. This has the effect of reducing the long-run interest rates, which in
turn produces a real depreciation of the exchange rate and a consequent improvement of
the trade balance. By contrast, when political events induce agents to revise upwards their
expectation of future spending, interest rates go up and the domestic currency appreciates.
But does spending reversal hold true also for the foresight shock? To answer this question
we show in Figure 7 the impulse response functions of both the foresight shock (upper panel)
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and the surprise shock (lower panel) on FEDGOV over the unusually long horizon of 20
years. The result is striking. For both shocks, the impulse response functions have the
shape of a long-run sine wave with a period of about 20 years. Positive effects are followed
by significantly negative effects, with a distance of about ten years between the turning
points. The two functions, which look inconsistent in the range 0-20 quarters, now appear
very similar, albeit out of phase by about five years. Indeed, a closer look to Figures 5 and
6 reveals that all differences reduce to a phase shift. Figure 8 reports, on the left column,
the response functions of F (1, 4), FEDGOV, SUR and RER to the foresight shock, taken
from lag 20 onward, and, on the right column, the corresponding response functions for the
surprise shock. The response functions in the left column are much smoother because of an
obvious estimation effect, but, apart for this, the general shape and the quantitative effects
are similar. The same result holds for the variables not shown in Figure 8.15 The effects of
the unanticipated shock mirror those of the anticipated shock with a 5-year delay.
So the answer is yes, reversal are observed also for news shocks but they occur much later,
after a period of persistent increase of government spending. The key factor to understand
the response of the real exchange rate to spending shocks is the timing of spending reversals.
When the shock generates persistent effects on government spending and reversals occur
only far in the future, then the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance worsens
through an increase in the long term interest rate. On the contrary, when the reversal occurs
quickly and the increase in spending is relatively short-lived the long term interest rate falls
and the currency depreciates.
6 What does the theory tell us?
Are the results in line with the theory? As already observed, Corsetti, Meier and Muller,
2012, proposes an open-economy model with spending reversal which delivers theoretical
predictions in line with our empirical results. In order to have a theoretical benchmark
we augment with government spending news shocks the two-country model of Faccini,
Mumtaz and Surico, 2012, which is a simplified version of Corsetti, Meier and Muller,
2012.16 Spending reversals are introduced along the lines of Corsetti, Meier and Muller,
2012, by extending the standard government spending rule with a debt component. More
specifically, government spending follows the relation
gt = φgt−1 + δdt + γ(L)ut, ut ∼ N(0, 1) (8)
15The only exception is the initial jump of GDP following the unanticipated shock, which is missing for
the foresight shock, since there is no jump in federal spending at lag 20.
16We refer the reader to the Appendix of Faccini, Mumtaz and Surico, 2012, for the model equations and
their log linear form.
18
where dt is public debt, ut is the government spending shock and γ(L) is a polynomial in the
lag operator. We consider various specifications of equation (8). All the parametrization
share the same value of the autoregressive parameter φ = 0.9. We consider both the case
with no spending reversal (δ = 0) and with spending reversal (in line with the literature,
we set δ = −0.02). For each of the two calibrations of δ we derive the theoretical impulse
response functions of both the surprise and the news shock. We do this by using different
parameterizations of γ(L). For the surprise shock we assume γ(L) = 1. For the news
shock we use two different specifications. In the former one (specification 1) we assume a
simple delay of 4 quarters, i.e. γ(L) = L4. In the latter one (specification 2) we assume the
triangular MA(21) distributed lag
γ(L) =
21∑
k=3
γkL
k γk =
1− |k − 12|/10
3.8
(9)
The coefficients of the MA are chosen to get an hump-shaped impulse response function for
government spending, peaking at lag 15 with a value equal to 1, in the model with spending
reversals.
Figure 9a and 9b report the impulse response functions for the model with no reversal
and the model with spending reversals, respectively. The dotted line corresponds to the
surprise shock, i.e. γ(L) = 1. The other lines correspond to the news shocks: the dashed
line corresponds to the specification γ(L) = L4; the solid line corresponds to the MA(21)
specification.
In absence of spending reversal (Figure 9a), the effects of surprise and news shocks have
the same sign for all variables except government spending and GDP. The long term interest
rate increases, the real exchange rate appreciates, net exports decline, and consumption falls
after an expansionary government spending shock, in all specifications. The only noticeable
difference between anticipated and non-anticipated shocks is in the impact response of
government spending: for news shocks, government spending does not react on impact, so
that the response of GDP is negative due to the decline of consumption and net exports.
Comparing theoretical and empirical responses, the surprise shock exhibits the depre-
ciation puzzle while the news shock does not. Moreover, it should be observed that the
empirical response of consumption is puzzling for both shocks. In the model consumption
and interest rates move in opposite directions following a spending shock, whereas the em-
pirical responses have the same sign (negative for the surprise shock, positive for the news
shock). Finally, note that the theoretical impulse response functions do not exhibit the
long-run waves observed in the data.
Figure 9b plots the theoretical impulse response functions for the specification with
spending reversals. As already shown in the literature, spending reversals make theoretical
and empirical responses to the surprise shock much closer. In particular, the reversal gen-
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erates a depreciation of the exchange rate triggered by the reduction of the long-term rate.
As for the news shock, the responses are still in line with empirical evidence for government
spending, the interest rate, the exchange rate and net exports. For both shocks, reversals
generate waves similar to those found in the VAR.
On the other hand, the empirical behavior of consumption is still puzzling for both
shocks. After a news shock, specification 2, the model predicts that consumption should
decline because of the increase in the interest rate. Given that government spending is
unchanged on impact and net exports reduce, GDP should decline as well. This is in contrast
with the empirical evidence, where both consumption and GDP are found to increase. Hence
we are left with an open question: why should output increase immediately in anticipation
of spending, driving up interest rates and appreciating the currency?
7 Conclusions
We document that a substantial part of government spending is well anticipated over a
one year horizon. It is then important to separate news from surprise shocks. Once news
and surprise shocks are treated as different shocks, there is no depreciation puzzle for news
shocks. On the other hand, the depreciation puzzle is still there with surprise shocks.
Fiscal foresight seems to lie at the heart of the different exchange rate responses to news
and surprise shocks, depending on the timing of the anticipated budget adjustment following
the shock. Indeed, empirical results are broadly consistent with the prediction of a DSGE
model with spending reversals. The evidence however raises a different puzzle. According to
the theory, consumption and interest rates move in opposite direction, whereas the empirical
responses have the same sign (negative for the surprise shock, positive for the news shock).
As a consequence, output is found to increase on impact in anticipation of spending, contrary
to the prediction of standard DSGE models.
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Tables
Horizon: quarters ahead
Method 0 1 2 3 4
non-cumulated forecasts
AR(4) 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.99 1.05
ARX(4,1) 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.98 1.03
SPF FEDGOV growth 0.80* 0.83** 0.84 0.84*** 0.85***
SPF GDP growth 0.52 0.77 0.88 0.89 0.91
SPF CONS growth 0.64 0.82 0.90 1.00 0.99
cumulated forecasts
AR(4) 0.92 0.80 0.75 0.77 0.83
ARX(4,1) 0.94 0.80 0.72 0.73 0.78
SPF FEDGOV growth 0.80* 0.68 0.62 0.54** 0.50***
SPF GDP growth 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.67 0.72
SPF CONS growth 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.73 0.77
Table 1. Accuracy of professional forecasts (SPF) and alternative forecasts obtained with standard
time series methods. Accuracy is measured by the Mean Square Forecast Error, divided by the
variance of the target variable. In the first three lines of each panel the target variable is federal
government spending growth. In the last two lines of each panel the target is GDP growth and
consumption growth, respectively. The alternative models are a simple autoregressive mode of order
4 (AR(4)) and an autoregressive model of order 4 augmented with the first lag of GDP growth and
the spread between the 10-year bond interest rate and the federal funds rate (ARX(4,1)). The stars
denote significance of the Diebold and Mariano test against the ARX(4,1): one star 10%; two stars
5%; three stars 1%.
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Number of lags
Regressors 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
3-variable VAR (specification B)
f(0) 0.17 0.36 0.44 0.07
f(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
f(2) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
f(3) 0.37 0.39 0.01 0.02
f(4) 0.22 0.19 0.28 0.03
All 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05
F (1, 4) 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.08
7-variable VAR (specification A)
f(0) 0.53 0.77 0.93 0.46
f(1) 0.34 0.40 0.51 0.60
f(2) 0.43 0.62 0.76 0.84
f(3) 0.59 0.42 0.52 0.61
f(4) 0.71 0.60 0.56 0.61
All 0.71 0.60 0.56 0.61
F (1, 4) 0.38 0.43 0.51 0.81
Table 2. Test of orthogonality: p-values of the F -test of the regression of the federal government
spending shock estimated with the 7-variable VAR on seven sets of regressors. The first five include
the series reported by the Survey, from f(0) to f(4), taken one at a time. The sixth set (All) includes
all of the series f(h), h = 0, . . . , 4. The seventh set includes the sum F (1, 4) = f(1) + · · ·+ f(4).
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Number of lags
Regressors 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
3-variable VAR (specification B)
pc1 0.68 0.84 0.92 0.97
pc2 0.03 0.09 0.22 0.26
pc3 0.57 0.37 0.58 0.63
pc4 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.10
pc5 0.13 0.18 0.34 0.36
pc1 − pc5 0.30 0.40 0.64 0.49
7-variable VAR (specification A)
pc1 0.99 0.39 0.43 0.68
pc2 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.25
pc3 0.61 0.53 0.71 0.89
pc4 0.12 0.25 0.15 0.07
pc5 0.72 0.73 0.87 0.47
pc1 − pc5 0.72 0.72 0.89 0.81
Table 3. Test of orthogonality: p-values of the F -test of the regression of the federal government
spending shock estimated with the 7-variable VAR on six sets of regressors. The first five include
the largest five principal components of a macroeconomic data set (see Forni et al. 2014 for details),
taken one at a time. The sixth set includes all of the largest five principal components.
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Horizon: quarters after the shock
Variables 0 4 8 12 24
News shock - Identification #1
FEDGOV 0.0 3.0 10.8 21.6 29.6
F (1, 4) 99.2 58.7 45.2 36.8 27.4
GDP 1.3 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.9
CONS 9.2 6.4 6.2 6.1 6.2
SUR 0.8 2.4 6.3 10.9 13.4
NX 0.8 8.5 10.9 13.4 13.7
10YBOND 3.8 13.9 12.6 11.3 10.6
RER 1.8 3.9 10.0 9.8 12.7
News shock - Identification #2
FEDGOV 0.0 2.0 4.2 6.7 10.8
GDP 2.9 10.6 9.8 9.2 7.6
CONS 6.4 8.5 10.6 10.7 8.1
SUR 1.6 2.8 3.5 3.9 5.9
NX 0.8 7.8 10.1 12.9 11.4
10YBOND 4.8 16.0 13.5 13.7 13.5
RER 2.1 9.5 15.7 14.1 13.6
Surprise shock - Identification #1
FEDGOV 100.0 69.9 59.4 44.3 21.3
F (1, 4) 0.8 3.4 4.9 7.9 14.2
GDP 8.7 4.1 5.3 5.2 5.5
CONS 0.9 4.0 5.9 6.4 8.3
SUR 6.9 8.2 9.8 8.5 7.3
NX 0.8 2.8 4.5 5.3 11.3
10YBOND 0.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.7
RER 5.7 8.6 11.2 13.6 16.0
Table 4: Variance decomposition. Percentage of the forecast error variance explained by the news
and surprise shocks at different horizons.
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Figures
Figure 1: Impulse response functions to the government spending shock in a seven-variable bayesian VAR
with diffuse prior including, in this order, real federal spending, real GDP, real consumption, federal surplus
divided by GDP, net exports divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and the exchange rate. The
shock is the first one of the Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point estimates (average across 500
draws), dark-gray area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
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Figure 2: Top panel - spending news variable NEWS; mid panel - news shock under identification #1; bottom
panel - news shock under identification #2. The vertical lines are associated with the following episodes:
(1) 1983:I - Strategic Defense Initiative;
(2) 1986:I - Emergency Deficit Control Act;
(3) 1987:IV - Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act
(4) 1989:IV - Berlin Wall fall;
(5) 1990:III - Gulf War;
(6) 1992:IV - Clinton’s election;
(7) 1993:III - Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act;
(8) 1999:I - Kosovo War;
(9) 2001:IV - War in Afghanistan;
(10) 2003:I - II Gulf War;
(11) 2008:I - 2008 Fiscal Stimulus;
(12) 2009:I - Obama Fiscal Stimulus;
(13) 2011:III - Budget Control Act of 2011.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a foresight (anticipated) spending shock (Identification #1) with in
a eight-variable Bayesian VAR with diffuse prior including, in this order, real federal spending, the cumu-
lated professional forecast F (1, 4), real GDP, real consumption, federal surplus divided by GDP, net exports
divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and the exchange rate; the shock is the second one of the
Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point estimates (average across 500 draws), dark-gray area is the
68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a foresight (anticipated) spending shock (Identification #2)
in a eight-variable bayesian VAR with diffuse prior including, in this order, the news spending vari-
able, real federal spending, real GDP, real consumption, federal surplus divided by GDP, net exports
divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and the exchange rate. The shock is the first one of
the Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point estimates (average across 500 draws), dark-gray
area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
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Figure 5: Top panel - surprise shock in specification A; mid panel - surprise shock under identification #1;
bottom panel - surprise shock under identification #2. The vertical lines are associated with the following
episodes:
(1) 1983:I - Strategic Defense Initiative;
(2) 1986:I - Emergency Deficit Control Act;
(3) 1987:IV - Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act
(4) 1989:IV - Berlin Wall fall;
(5) 1990:III - Gulf War;
(6) 1992:IV - Clinton’s election;
(7) 1993:III - Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act;
(8) 1999:I - Kosovo War;
(9) 2001:IV - War in Afghanistan;
(10) 2003:I - II Gulf War;
(11) 2008:I - 2008 Fiscal Stimulus;
(12) 2009:I - Obama Fiscal Stimulus;
(13) 2011:III - Budget Control Act of 2011.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a surprise (unanticipated) spending shock (Identification
#1) in a eight-variable Bayesian VAR with diffuse prior including, in this order, real federal spend-
ing, the cumulated professional forecast F (1, 4), real GDP, real consumption, federal surplus divided
by GDP, net exports divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and the exchange rate; the
shock is the first one of the Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point estimates (average across
500 draws), dark-gray area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions to a foresight (upper panel) and a surprise (lower panel)
spending shock (Identification #1) to real federal spending. The horizon of the horizontal axis is
enlarged to 20 years. Solid lines are point estimates (average across 500 draws), dark-gray area is
the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
35
Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a foresight (right column) and a surprise (left column)
spending shock (Identification #1) to selected variables. In the right column the impulse response
functions are shifted ahead by 20 periods. Solid lines are point estimates (average across 500 draws),
dark-gray area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
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Figure 9a: Theoretical impulse response functions of surprise and news shocks in the model of
Faccini, Mumtaz and Surico, 2012, with no spending reversals. Dotted line: γ(L) = 1 (surprise
shock). Dashed line: γ(L) = L4 (news shock, specification 1). Solid line: γ(L) =
∑21
k=3 γkL
k, γk =
1−|k−12|/10
3.8 (news shock, specification 2).
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Figure 9b: Theoretical impulse response functions of surprise and news shocks in the model of
Faccini, Mumtaz and Surico, 2012, with spending reversals. Dotted line: γ(L) = 1 (surprise shock).
Dashed line: γ(L) = L4 (news shock, specification 1). Solid line: γ(L) =
∑21
k=3 γkL
k, γk =
1−|k−12|/10
3.8 (news shock, specification 2).
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Appendix: Robustness
We make a few robustness checks. As observed in Subsection 4.1, the news shock could also be
identified by ordering the news variable first. The impulse response functions obtained under this
alternative ordering for Specification #2 are shown in Figure A1. The figure is very similar to Figure
4. The only minor difference is that the impact effect of the news shock on government spending,
being not forced to be 0, is now positive, albeit small and not significant. This result confirm the
validity of our assumption about the information set of the professional forecasters.
As a second robustness check, following the discussion of Subsection 4.3, we identified the surprise
shock by using two alternative methods: first, we used the expectation revision gt − EPt−1gt, as in
Ramey, 2011; second, we used the nowcast error gt − EPt gt, as in Ricco, 2013. Such variables are
ordered first in the respective VARs and the surprise shock is obtained in both cases as the first
Cholesky shock. The estimated impulse response functions are displayed in Figures A2 and A3. The
results are almost identical to those obtained with the baseline identification (Figure 6): the shock
triggers a real depreciation of the exchange rate as well as an improvement in the trade balance.
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Figure A1: Impulse response functions to a news shock. The VAR includes, in this order, the news
spending variable, real federal spending, real GDP, real consumption, federal surplus divided by
GDP, net exports divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and the exchange rate; the shock
is the first one of the Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point estimates (average across 500
draws), dark-gray area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90% confidence region.
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Figure A2: Impulse response functions to a surprise (unanticipated) shock. The VAR includes, in
this order, the expectation revision gt −EPt−1gt, real federal spending, real GDP, real consumption,
federal surplus divided by GDP, net exports divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and
the exchange rate; the shock is the first one of the Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point
estimates (average across 500 draws), dark-gray area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is
the 90% confidence region.
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Figure A3: Impulse response functions to a surprise (unanticipated) shock. The VAR includes, in
this order, the nowcast error gt − EPt gt, real federal spending, real GDP, real consumption, federal
surplus divided by GDP, net exports divided by GDP, the 10-year bond interest rate and the ex-
change rate; the shock is the first one of the Cholesky decomposition. Solid lines are point estimates
(average across 500 draws), dark-gray area is the 68% confidence region; light-gray area is the 90%
confidence region.
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